

CAN THE NATION TRUST THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY ?

Can the nation trust Democracy with the administration of the Government? This question has already been answered by the people four times—first in 1860, second in 1864, third in 1868, fourth in 1872. Each time the answer has been given by overwhelming majorities: "The Democratic party cannot be trusted with the control of the Government!"

Is there anything in the present condition of the country, or the present character of the Democratic party, to call for a change of the popular verdict in 1876?

If there is, what is its nature? Have the people become less loyal to the Union, or has Democracy become more loyal? To call for a reversal of the verdict, rendered four times, a radical change must be shown, either in the sentiments of the people, or in the sentiments of the Democratic party. Has this change taken place? If so, when, where, and under what circumstances?

No friend of good government, who desires peace and unity, could for a moment desire the restoration of Democracy to power, if he felt assured that its political principles were the same as those held previous to the rebellion, during its existence and throughout the period of reconstruction.

To believe otherwise, would be to believe that good citizens could be found who would be willing to reject the party whose wisdom, patriotism, and courage saved the Government, and accept the party whose energies and influence were united in the effort to overthrow it. Fair-minded men will agree on the two propositions. First, The man who proves his friendship in the hour of need ought not to be distrusted in the hour of prosperity. Second, The man who showed his enmity when friendship was needed, has no claim to our confidence when his enmity can no longer injure us. It is possible for a former friend to become an enemy, and an old enemy to become a friend; but the proof of the change must precede the belief that it has actually taken place.

The rule holds good with parties, for parties are but individuals in their collective capacity; and for this reason it may be laid down as a rule, that whatever of sentiment or principle characterizes individuals, will surely find reflection in the parties with which they affiliate.

Therefore, the practical question for reasonable men to ask and answer is, Is the Democratic party, in principle and sentiment, the same as it was in 1861? If it is, then it cannot be trusted to-day. If it is not the same, wherein does it differ? Is the change a radical one, so honestly and earnestly made as to preclude the possibility of a recurrence of troubles which were met and overcome by

the Nation hundreds of thousands of lives, and millions of treasure?

Before the people can consider, on equal terms, the restoration of Democracy to power, the proof must be submitted that a radical change has taken place in its sentiments and principles, its teachings and purposes. The proof must be strong, so clear that he who runs may read; for on a question of such vital importance to the future welfare of the Republic, the people cannot afford to run any risks. The preservation of the Government has cost them too much to try any political experiments in the management of its affairs. The people know what the Republican party has done, is now doing, and will do in the future for the country. On the vital question of unity and nationality, they are assured that it can be trusted. True in war, they know it cannot prove false in peace. True in the past, they have every reason to believe that it will continue true in the future. Democracy having been false in the past, they have the right to demand the strongest guarantee that it will not be, if entrusted with power, false in the future.

Can Democracy give such guarantee? Has it abandoned the fatal doctrine of State Rights as preached by Calhoun, fought for by the Southern Confederacy, and practically maintained by the Southern wing of the party to-day? If on these points the proof is clear that a radical change has taken place, then the issue is simply one of administration, turning upon the relative character of men, and not upon the principles which they hold. The result, whatever it might be, would no longer be experimental; for the people would feel assured that a change of administration would not imperil the peace and unity of the Nation.

A careful review of the Democratic record must be convincing to the unprejudiced mind that no change has taken place in the sentiments of Democracy. What it believed in the days of Buchanan, it advocated in 1860, endorsed in 1864, affirmed in 1868, re-affirmed in 1872, and, unless checked in its pretensions by the votes of the American people, it will re-establish through a Democratic administration in 1876.

DEMOCRACY, THE STATE RIGHTS PARTY.

For the past forty years, the Democratic party has been controlled by men who accepted the fatal doctrine of State Rights, as preached by John C. Calhoun, as the basis of our Federal Union.

Under this doctrine, the State was held to be supreme. The Union was regarded as a mere arrangement for convenience, to be cast aside whenever it suited the pleasure or interest of a State to so decide.

A State could obey or disobey the laws of

a State Convention, could, under this doctrine, place the State outside of the national authority. A simple resolution declaring that the State had withdrawn from the Union was all that was required to transform the part into the whole, or the fraction of a nation into a nation, supreme in its own sovereignty. It was held by the advocates of this State Rights doctrine, that a State, entering the Union of its own free will, could withdraw with equal freedom. In other words, one party to a contract could break it at his pleasure, because he entered it of his own free will.

The sophism itself is, in the language of Abraham Lincoln:

"That any State of the Union may, consistently with the national Constitution, and therefore lawfully and peacefully, withdraw from the Union, without the consent of the Union, or of any other State. The little disguise that the supposed right is to be exercised only for just cause, themselves to be the sole judge of its justice, is too thin to merit any notice. With rebellion thus sugar-coated, they have been drugging the public mind of their section for more than thirty years; and until at length they have brought many good men to a willingness to take up arms against the Government the day after some assemblage of men have enacted the farcical pretense of taking their State out of the Union, who could have been brought to no such thing the day before."

President Lincoln, in his first message to Congress, July 4, 1861, disposes of this pretentious doctrine in the following words:

"What is now combatted is the position that secession is consistent with the Constitution—is lawful and peaceful. It is not contended that there is any express law for it; and nothing should ever be implied as law which leads to unjust or absurd consequences. The Nation purchased with money the countries out of which several of these States were formed. Is it just that they should go off, without leave and without refunding? The Nation paid very large sums (in the aggregate, I believe, nearly a hundred millions) to relieve Florida of the aboriginal tribes. Is it just that they should now be off without consent, or without making any return? The Nation is now in debt for money applied to the benefit of these so-called seceding States, common with the rest. Is it just either that creditors should go unpaid, or the remaining states pay the whole? A part of the present national debt was contracted to pay the old debts of Texas. Is it just that she should leave, and pay no part of this herself?

"Again, if one State may secede, so may another; and when all shall have seceded, none is left to pay the debts. Is this quite just to creditors? Did we notify them of this sage view of ours when we borrowed their money?

"If we now recognize this doctrine, by allowing the seceders to go in peace, it is difficult to see what we can do if others

"If all the States save one should assert the power to drive that one out of the Union, it is presumed the whole class of seceder politicians would at once deny the power, and denounce the act as the greatest outrage upon State Rights. But suppose that precisely the same act, instead of being called 'driving the one out,' should be called 'the seceding of all the others from that one,' it would be exactly what the seceders claim to do; unless, indeed, they make the point that the one, because it is a minority, may rightfully do what the others, because they are a majority, may not rightfully do. These politicians are subtle and profound on the rights of minorities. They are not partial to that power which made the Constitution, and speaks from the preamble, calling itself, 'We the People.'

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"As a private citizen, the Executive could not have consented that these institutions shall perish, much less could he in betrayal of so vast and so sacred a trust as these free people had confided to him. He felt that he had no moral right to shrink, nor even to count the chances of his own life, in what might follow. In full view of his great responsibility, he has, so far, done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment, perform yours."

Through the courage and patriotism of the American people, the Government has been preserved. The practical issue now presented is, Shall the control of the Government be taken from the loyal hands that preserved it, and placed in the hands of those who endeavored to destroy it?

All other issues are secondary. Finance, protection, or free trade, as national issues, are unworthy of mention when compared with the vital issue before the people, Shall the Nation be ruled by those who have proven their loyalty, or by those who conspired to betray it?

On this plain issue, the vital one in the pending campaign, the question is again asked. Can the Nation trust the Democratic party?

We are asked to forget the past, to turn our back on the things that have been, and face the things that are to be. This is a human impossibility. The past is the index of the future—the best light to guide individuals or nations. To shut our eyes or ears to its teachings, is to invite disasters which its wisdom directs us to avoid.

The deeds of the fathers are the pride of our generation. We talk of them, glory over them, and hold them up as examples to make us better and wiser. Our Centennial celebrations develop our sense of justice, and prove that even the changes of a century cannot obliterate from our hearts the gratitude which we owe to the memory of those whose wisdom and patriotism gave birth to the Republic.

The loyal people, through President Lincoln, their representatives in Congress, and the army and navy, nobly performed their

solve, was crushed after years of bloody conflict. This conflict cost the nation at least 500,000 lives and \$5,000,000,000. Great as was the sacrifice, those who were called upon to make it, never faltered in the performance of their work. Shall those who to-day are enjoying the fruits of their labor, falter in the performance of a duty no less sacred than the one that secured to humanity the unity, integrity, and freedom of our great Republic?

Therefore, to forget the recent struggle, to blind ourselves to that noble spirit of loyalty which sacrificed life and treasure to perpetuate the work of the early fathers, would be to trample justice under foot, and acknowledge ourselves unworthy the sacred trust transmitted to us. To forgive our enemies is a divine injunction; but even divine forgiveness does not imply forgetfulness of right and wrong, nor require the surrender of the right, or those who were true to it, to the wrong, and those who upheld it.

Reconciliation is desirable, but it should be brought about on a national basis. The spirit of reconciliation which demands, as a condition, the restoration of the Democratic State Rights party, would be not only treacherous, but dangerous to the peace of the nation.

The fatal heresy of State Rights ought to have died with the Rebellion. The Southern Confederacy illustrated its full power, and with its overthrow the doctrine should have been buried from sight forever.

If Northern Democracy had been free from its influence, this would have been the case, but it retained the old poison in its system. It has never been free from it, and to-day, united with the Bourbon Democracy of the South, it is under the control of Calhounism, and liable, if entrusted with power, to again plunge the country, on some slight pretext, into troubles even greater than those hitherto endured.

THE DEMOCRATIC RECORD BEFORE THE WAR.

Through Democracy, the South, prior to the war, practically controlled the Government. It shaped the affairs of the nation to suit its own interest. It filled its important offices at home and abroad. It gave direction to national legislation; it created the policy of the Government, and when it could no longer govern, it endeavored to destroy. This statement is a correct one. It has passed into history, and cannot be refuted.

Alexander H. Stephens, who afterward became the Vice-President of the Southern Confederacy, delivered a speech against the policy of secession, before the State Convention of Georgia, January, 1861. He said:

"What have we to gain by this proposed change of our relation to the General Government?

"We have always had the control of it, and can yet, if we remain in it, and are as united as we have been. We have had a majority of the Presidents chosen from the South, as well as the control and management of those chosen

of Southern Presidents to their twenty-four, thus controlling the Executive Department. So, of the judges of the Supreme Court, we have had eighteen from the South, and but eleven from the North; although nearly four-fifths of the judicial business has arisen in the Free States, yet a majority of the Court has always been from the South. This we have required so as to guard against any interpretation of the Constitution unfavorable to us. In like manner, we have been equally watchful to guard our interests in the Legislative branch of Government. In choosing the presiding Presidents (*pro tem*) of the Senate, we have had twenty-four to their eleven. Speakers of the House, we have had twenty-three, and they twelve. While the majority of the Representatives, from their greater population, have always been from the North, yet we have generally secured the Speaker, because he, to a great extent, shapes and controls the legislation of the country. Nor have we had less control in every other Department of the General Government. Attorney-Generals we have had fourteen, while the North have had but five. Foreign Ministers, we have had eighty-six and they but fifty-four. While three-fourths of the business which demands diplomatic agents abroad is clearly from the free States, from their greater commercial interests, yet we have had the principal embassies so as to secure the world-markets for our cotton, tobacco, and sugar, on the best possible terms. We have had a vast majority of the higher officers of both army and navy, while a larger portion of the soldiers and sailors were drawn from the North. Equally so of clerks, auditors, and comptrollers filling the Executive Department, the records show for the last fifty years, that of the three thousand thus employed, we have had more than two-thirds of the same, while we have had but one-third of the white population of the Republic.

"Again, look at another item, and one, be assured, in which we have a great and vital interest: it is that of revenue, or means of supporting Government. From official documents, we learn that a fraction over three-fourths of the revenue collected for the support of Government, has uniformly been raised from the North.

"The expense for the transportation of the mail in the free States was, by the report of the Postmaster General, for the year 1860, a little over \$13,000,000, while the income was \$19,000,000. But in the slave States, the transportation of the mail was \$14,716,000, while the revenue from the same was \$8,001,026, leaving a deficit of \$6,704,974, to be supplied by the North for our accommodation, and without it we must have been entirely cut off from this most essential branch of the Government."

This, be it remembered, is not the language of a Republican, trying to paint a picture for party effect, but the words of the Vice President of the late Confederacy, who will be accepted as good authority by the most ultra Democrat.

1st. That the Democratic party before the war was under the control of the South, and used its power to promote Southern interests and ambition at the expense of the North.

2d. It shows that the South had no justification for its attempt to withdraw from the Union.

3d. It proves the fallacy of its pretensions, that it was driven into rebellion by Northern oppression.

4th. It clearly indicates the treasonable nature of the party that preferred to break up a Government that it could no longer control, rather than submit to constitutional authority.

5th. It foreshadows the ascendancy of Southern influence in all departments of the Government under Democratic restoration.

The statement made by Mr. Stephens must convince all who are open to conviction, that the Southern States had no just cause for complaint. The defeat of the State Rights party, and through this defeat, the loss of the controlling power, were the causes which brought about secession.

Long before the election of Abraham Lincoln, the Democratic threat had been made, both in the North and the South, that the slave States would not submit to a Republican President. The threat was general throughout the South, and was repeated by Northern leaders on the stump, and by the Democratic press, without a word of protest or condemnation. On the contrary, every encouragement was held out, that the Democrats of the North would not only endorse the threat of secession, but lend material aid in carrying it out.

In December, 1860, Mr. Gregg, one of the delegates to the South Carolina Convention, said:

"If we wish to find the immediate cause of the secession of South Carolina, the immediate cause of all is the election of Abraham Lincoln."

In the same convention, Mr. Dargan said:

"It is not true, in point of fact, that all the Northern people are hostile to the rights of the South. *We have a Spartan band in every Northern State.* It is due to them they should know the reasons which influence us. According to our apprehension, the necessity which exists for our immediate withdrawal from association with the Northern States, is that this hostile Abolition party have the control of the Government."

In November, 1860, Mr. Lawrence M. Keitt delivered a speech in Charleston, S. C. He said, in answer to an assertion that any attempt to withdraw from the Union would be met with force:

"Let me tell you, *there are a million of Democrats in the North, who, when the Black Republicans attempt to march upon the South, will be found a wall of fire in the front.*" (Cries of "That's so!" and applause.)

This was the feeling through the entire South. Democracy had been regarded as the State Rights party, and it was believed that any attempt to interfere with a State

in its withdrawal from the Union, would unite Northern Democrats in armed opposition to it. This belief was encouraged by prominent leaders of the Northern wing of the party.

An extract from a letter, written January 6, 1860, by ex-President Pierce to Jefferson Davis, and found in Davis's home, in Mississippi, when taken by our troops, reveals the grounds of the belief so confidently expressed by leading Southerners, that Democracy would be a unit in their favor, in case a rebellion should be inaugurated.

After referring to political matters, and expressing a desire to have Mr. Davis the Democratic candidate for the Presidency, the ex-President says:

"Let me suggest that, in the running debates in Congress, full justice seems to me not to have been done to the Democracy of the North. I do not believe that our friends at the South have any just idea of the state of feeling, hurrying, at this moment, to the pitch of intense exasperation, between those who respect their political obligations, and those who have apparently no impelling power but that which fanatical passion on the subject of domestic slavery imparts. Without discussing the question of right, of abstract power, to secede, I have never believed that actual disruption of the Union can occur without blood; and if, through the madness of Northern Abolitionism, that dire calamity must come, *the fighting will not be along Mason's and Dixon's line, merely. It will be within our own borders—in our own streets—between the two classes of citizens to whom I have referred.*"

Is it to be wondered at, that such assurance from so distinguished a Democrat as ex-President Pierce, and repeated in private letters and public speeches, by others of equal prominence, should leave the impression upon the Southern mind that armed hostility against the Government, on the part of the South, would receive the active sympathy of Northern Democracy?

In January, 1861, Fernando Wood, then Mayor of New York city, sent a message to the Common Council, recommending the withdrawal of the city from the State. He favored "a free city," as he termed it, and his scheme met with approval from many leading Democrats.

About the same time (January 16), as if it was a part of the Democratic programme, a meeting of Democrats was held in National Hall, Philadelphia. At this meeting a resolution was adopted, favoring the withdrawal of Pennsylvania from the Union, and expressing sentiments in keeping with those of the South.

It is well known that leading Democrats of the North conspired, in the spring of 1861, to carry their respective States out of the Union. Ex-Governor Price, of New Jersey, in a letter to L. W. Burnet, of Newark, N. J., said:

"I believe the Southern Confederation permanent. The proceeding has been taken

with forethought and deliberation—it is no hurried impulse, but an irrevocable act, based upon the sacred, as was supposed, ‘equality of the States,’ and in my opinion, every slave State will, in a short period of time, be found united in one confederacy. * * * What position for New Jersey will best accord with her interests, honor, and the patriotic instincts of her people? I say emphatically, she should go with the South, from every wise, prudential, and patriotic reason.”

In this letter, the ex-Governor also gives it as his opinion that New York and Pennsylvania will “choose also to cast their lot with the South,” and, after them, the Western and Northwestern States.

If necessary, a volume could be filled with unimpeachable evidence, tending to prove that the Southern people were misled by Democratic leaders, North and South. In the fall and winter of 1860, and the spring of 1861, the air was filled with Democratic threats and promises. Incendiary speeches were made, and secret caucuses held at the National Capital. The highest Government officials—all Democrats—conspired with the public enemies. Even President Buchanan, although he declared that “the election of any one of our fellow-citizens to the office of President, does not of itself afford just cause for dissolving the Union,” gave his official encouragement to the dissolution, by stating in his last annual message, Dec. 4, 1860:

“After much serious reflection, I have arrived at the conclusion that the Constitution has not delegated to Congress, nor to any other department of the Federal Government, the power to coerce a State into submission, which is attempting to withdraw, or has actually withdrawn from the confederacy.”

At an earlier date, Nov. 20, 1860, Attorney General Black had given his opinion to the same effect. According to this view, the Government could act only on the defensive. It could repel an attack, but it had no Constitutional right to assert its authority or protect itself by any offensive measures. In his own language, “The Union must utterly perish at the moment when Congress shall arm one part of the people against another for any purpose beyond that of merely protecting the General Government in the exercise of its proper Constitutional functions.”

If we need more convincing proof of Democratic encouragement of the Southern rebellion, than what has already been presented, it may be found in the deliberate transfer of arms from Northern to Southern arsenals, by order of a Democratic Secretary of War, Mr. Floyd.

From a report made by Mr. B. Stanton, from the Committee on Military Affairs, in the House of Representatives, Feb. 18, 1861, it is shown that, in the spring of 1860, the following transfers of muskets were made from the Springfield armory, and the Watertown and Watervliet arsenals:

	Peren- sion Muskets.	Altered Muskets.	Rifles.
To Charleston Arsenal.....	9,280	5,720	2,000
To North Carolina Arsenal.....	15,480	9,520	2,000
To Augusta Arsenal.....	12,380	7,620	2,000
To Mount Vernon Arsenal.....	9,280	5,720	2,000
To Baton Rouge Arsenal.....	18,580	11,420	2,000
Total.....	65,000	40,000	10,000

All these arms fell into the possession of the Confederate authorities, as it was known they would by the Democratic Secretary of War, when he ordered the transfer.

It was also shown in the same report, that the Secretary of War ordered the transfer of forty columbiads and four 32-pounders, to unfinished forts on Ship Island, on the coast of Mississippi, and seventy columbiads and seven 32-pounders to be sent to Galveston, Texas, where the fort to receive them had just been commenced. So clear was the evidence that these heavy guns were intended for the use of the rebels, that a monster mass meeting was held at Allegheny, Pa., the place where the arsenal containing them was located, and a protest was entered against their removal. Through the action of Judge Holt, the present Judge Advocate-General, the transfer of the guns was prevented.

In addition to the arms sent South by a Democratic Secretary of War, upwards of 50,000 muskets were sold by the Government to parties representing Southern interests. These muskets were in good condition, and yet were sold for \$2.50. Add to the number transferred and sold, the annual quota distributed to the Southern States for 1861, in advance, and it will be found that not less than 300,000 muskets were placed in the hands of secessionists, by the direct order of a Democratic Secretary of War. This is what the *Mobile Advertiser* said at the time:

“During the past year, 135,430 muskets have been quietly transferred from the Northern arsenal at Springfield alone, to those in the Southern States. We are much obliged to Secretary Floyd for the foresight he has thus displayed in *disarming the North and equipping the South for this emergency*. There is no telling the quantity of arms and munitions which were sent South from other Northern arsenals. There is no doubt but that every man in the South who can carry a gun can now be supplied from private or public sources. The Springfield contribution alone would arm all the militiamen of Alabama and Mississippi.”

Can any sane man doubt the effect of such encouragement, coming from the highest representatives of the Democratic party, upon an excited people? Is it surprising that the demagogues who fired the Southern hear gave prominence to the pledge so often made that the Democracy of the North would stand by the South in its armed resistance to Federal authority? Yet this is the party

that now demands control of the Government; and some of the very men who led it then are leaders now. They hold the same views of Federal power; they endorse the same fatal doctrine of State Rights; if intrusted with power they would encourage, as they did in 1860, the disruption of the Union. Can the Nation trust this party? Can it risk its future peace and prosperity in its hands? These are questions of vital importance, and no good citizen can avoid the responsibility involved in their answer.

THE DEMOCRATIC RECORD DURING THE WAR.

From the record thus far presented, the following deductions are made:

1. The Democratic party, as the State Rights party, educated its followers to believe in the right of a State to withdraw from the Union, at its pleasure.

2. It took no steps to counteract the fatal tendency of this doctrine when it assumed the form of open resistance to the Federal authority.

3. It had control of the Government when the secession movement developed its purpose to establish a Southern Confederacy, and instead of promptly checking it, it vitalized it, by giving it official encouragement.

4. The Democratic party, through its leading officials, not only encouraged secession by friendly expressions, but with a full knowledge of its hostile intentions, deliberately furnished its advocates with arms and munitions of war belonging to the Federal Government.

5. Judged by its record, the sympathy expressed, the promises given, the material aid rendered, the unanimous action of its Southern wing, the Democratic party stands responsible for the slaveholders' rebellion.

Democratic encouragement having made the rebellion possible, what was its policy during the war? Did it endeavor to undo the great wrong which it had committed, by promptly responding to the calls made upon the patriotism of the Nation? As a party, it did not. There were noble men who proclaimed themselves war Democrats, who responded with alacrity to the defence of the Government. They laid aside the partizan and became patriots, and by their sacrifices made good their early professions of fidelity to the Union and the Constitution.

But the Democratic party, as a political organization, was hostile to the Government and the efforts put forth for the suppression of the rebellion. Its mass meetings, its party caucuses, the correspondence of its leaders, the riots incited by its followers, its attitude in the elections, its undisguised expressions in Congress, its encouragement of desertion, and defense of those who were arrested for treasonable conduct, its continual clamors for peace in the face of the enemy,—all go to prove that its sympathies were with the Southern Confederacy, and against the cause of the Union.

On the 9th of January, 1861, Mr. Howard, of Michigan, offered, in the House of Repre-

sentatives, a resolution calling for the appointment of a committee to inquire,—

1. Whether any executive officer of the United States was treating with any person or persons for the surrender of the forts or other public property of the United States.

2. Whether any officer of the Government had entered into any pledge, agreement, or understanding, with any person or persons, not to send reinforcements to the forts in Charleston harbor.

3. What demand had been made for reinforcements, and why they had not been sent.

4. Where the ships of the navy were stationed.

5. What public property had been seized, and the particulars of such seizure.

6. What naval vessels had been seized, and whether any efforts had been made to protect or recover them.

These simple precautionary resolutions, intended to inform the Government of the extent of the danger, although adopted by the House, received only 17 Democratic votes out of the 133 yeas. Sixty Democrats voted against it.

On the 11th of February, 1861, on the bill providing for the construction of war vessels, the vote in the Senate stood 30 yeas to 18 nays—all Democrats in the negative. In the House, on the 20th, the vote stood 114 yeas to 38 nays, only 12 Democrats voting in its favor.

Lieut.-General Scott, apprehensive of an attack upon the Capital, had ordered seven companies of artillery, and one company of sappers and miners of the regular army, to be quartered at Washington.

February 14, 1861. Mr. Branch, of North Carolina, introduced a resolution, declaring the presence of these troops offensive and insulting, and demanding their immediate withdrawal.

This resolution was laid on the table, by a vote of 125 to 35. Thirteen Democrats voted in favor of the motion, to 35 against it.

February 21, 1861. A resolution was introduced by Mr. Dawes, censuring the Secretary of the Navy for sending to distant seas all the available ships of the navy at so critical a period, when their presence was needed at home; also, for accepting the resignation of officers who were in arms against the Government. The report accompanying the resolution says:

"That the entire naval force available for the defence of the whole Atlantic coast, at the time of the appointment of this committee, consisted of the steamer Brooklyn, 25 guns, and the storeship Relief, two guns, while the former was of too great draught to permit her to enter Charleston harbor with safety, except at spring tides, and the latter was under orders to the coast of Africa, with stores for the African squadron. Thus, the whole Atlantic seaboard has been, to all intents and purposes, without defence during all the period of civil commotion and lawless violence, to which the President has called our attention, as 'of such vast and alarming

proportions, as to be beyond his power to check or control."

Yet a resolution to censure so clear a betrayal of the public safety, and one that ought to have received the vote of every true man, received only one Democratic vote out of the 95 cast in its favor. Fifty-six Democrats voted against it.

July 9, 1861. Mr. Lovejoy offered in the House the following resolution: "That in the judgment of the House, it is no part of the duty of the soldiers of the United States to capture and return fugitive slaves." The vote was, yeas 92, nays 55, not a Democrat voting in its favor.

July 15, 1861. Mr. Benjamin Wood offered in the House a resolution recommending the several States to convene their Legislatures for the purpose of appointing delegates to a general convention to devise measures of peace. Although this proposition was offered a few days after the Federal army had been defeated at Bull Run, it received the entire Democratic vote, with the exception of one, who voted with the 93 Republicans against the resolution.

July 29, 1861. Mr. Cox offered a resolution, providing for the appointment of commissioners, empowering them to request from the Confederate States a like commission, the two bodies to meet and confer on such measures as may be deemed necessary "to assuage all grievances," said Commissioners to meet at Louisville on the first Monday in September, and in conjunction with a committee of one from each State, appointed by the House, consider such amendments to the Constitution as might tend to restore peace. Although the war was in full operation, and the South confident of success, this resolution commanded 41 Democratic votes—only two Democrats voting with the 83 Republicans against it. The vote stood 41 yeas, 85 nays.

August 2, 1861. On a bill to seize and appropriate the property of those in rebellion against the United States, and for the more effective suppression of the Rebellion, the vote stood yeas 61, nays 48, only two Democrats voting in its favor.

August 5, 1861. Mr. Calvert offered a resolution for the appointment of a committee of nine to consider and report upon amendments to the Constitution, necessary to secure peace. The vote stood 39 yeas, 72 nays, only one Democrat voting against it.

August 5, 1861. A bill was introduced in the House, approving of, and legalizing the acts of President Lincoln, in calling out the militia and strengthening the army and navy. Out of 74 votes in its favor, only three were Democrats. The 19 voting against it were Democrats.

December 30, 1861. Mr. Julian offered a resolution, instructing the judiciary committee to report a bill, so amending the fugitive slave law, as to forbid the recapture or return of any fugitive from labor without satisfactory proof that the claimant of such fugitive was loyal to the Government. The

resolution was passed, yeas 78, nays 39, not a Democrat voting in its favor.

February 6, 1862. The House voted on the proposition for the issue of \$150,000,000 in Treasury notes, known as "legal-tenders," also for the issue of \$500,000,000 in bonds. The vote was, in favor of the measure, 95, against it 60, only six Democrats voting in its favor.

February 25, 1862. The new article of war, prohibiting military or naval officers from employing any of their forces to capture or return into slavery any fugitive from service or labor, passed the House. Yeas, 95; nays, 51—only one Democrat voting in its favor.

April 3, 1862. A bill for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia passed the Senate, by a vote of 29 to 14, not a Democrat voting in its favor.

April 11, 1862. It passed the House by a vote of 92 to 39, only five Democrats voting in its favor.

May 12, 1862. A bill passed the House prohibiting slavery in the Territories of the United States. The vote stood, yeas 85, nays 50, only one Democrat voting in its favor.

June 9, 1862. Mr. Colfax introduced a resolution, instructing the Judiciary committee to report a bill giving the right of trial by jury to all fugitives who deny under oath that they were slaves; also requiring proof of loyalty on the part of the claimant. Adopted by yeas 77, nays 42, only two Democrats voting in its favor.

July 11, 1862. A bill was passed by the House, to "suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes." The vote stood, yeas 82, nays 42, not a Democrat voting in its favor.

July 16, 1862. A bill authorizing the President to receive into the United States service, persons of African descent, for the purpose of constructing intrenchments, performing camp service, and doing such military or naval service as they might be found competent to perform, was passed by the House, yeas 77, nays 30, only 4 Democrats voting in its favor.

Dec. 11, 1862. Mr. Yeaman, of Kentucky, offered a resolution, declaring that the Emancipation Proclamation of the President was not warranted by the Constitution—that the policy of Emancipation was dangerous to the rights of citizens and to the perpetuity of a free people. The vote on this was: In favor 47, against it 95, only 3 Democrats voting against it.

Dec 15, 1862. A resolution was introduced by Mr. S. C. Fessenden in the House, endorsing the President's emancipation proclamation as a war measure, as an exercise of power with proper regard for the rights of the State and the perpetuity of free government. The vote stood, yeas 78, nays 52, only two Democrats voting in its favor.

Jan. 28, 1863. Mr. Davis introduced a proviso to be added to a pending bill: "That no part of the sums appropriated by this act shall be disbursed for the pay, subsistence

or any other supplies of any negro, free or slave, in the armed military service of the United States." Eight Democrats voted in its favor, 28 Republicans against. A strict party vote.

February 20, 1863. The important measure, known as "The National Currency Act, of 1863," passed the House by a vote of 78 yeas, to 64 nays; only three Democrats voting in its favor. Under this act our present National Currency took the place of the defective currency issued under the old state bank system. The currency act of 1864, which passed the House April 18, was also opposed by the Democrats, the vote standing in its favor 80, to 66 against it, not a Democrat voting in its favor.

Dec. 14, 1863. Mr. Fernando Wood offered a resolution requesting the President to appoint three commissioners to negotiate with the authorities at Richmond, "to the end that this bloody, destructive and inhuman war shall cease."

Although no desire had been expressed on the part of the South for such a conference, this resolution was supported by 59 Democrats. 92 Republicans and 6 Democrats voted against it.

Dec. 17, 1863. Mr. Green Clay Smith offered a resolution in favor of "a vigorous prosecution of the war until the Constitution and law shall be enforced and obeyed in all parts of the United States," opposing any armistice or intervention "so long as there shall be found a rebel in arms against the Government," and ignoring "all party names, lines, and issues" until the authority of the Government was re-established. This was passed by a vote of 94 yeas, 65 nays, only four Democrats voting in its favor.

Dec. 17, 1863. Mr. Edgerton offered a resolution denouncing "as among the gravest of crimes, the invasion or occupation by armed forces, of any State, under the pretext or for the purpose of coercing the people thereof to modify or abrogate any of their laws or domestic institutions that are consistent with the Constitution of the United States." Although the laws and the institutions of the Confederate States were being used to destroy the Federal Government, this resolution was not opposed by a single Democrat. The vote stood: In its favor 66, against it 90, a strict party vote.

Dec. 21, 1863. Mr. Harding offered an amendment to the deficiency bill that no moneys appropriated should be used for the raising, arming, equipping or paying of negroes. It was favored by 41 Democrats, the vote standing, yeas 41, nays 105.

Jan. 18, 1864. The joint resolution, pending in the House, dropping from the rolls of the army all volunteer officers who were absent from duty, except for good cause, and intend to weed out of the service those useless officers who drew pay without performing service, was agreed to, by a vote of 72 to 45. This resolution had for its object the improvement of the service, yet not a Democrat voted in its favor.

Feb. 1, 1864. A resolution was introduced

by Mr. Eldridge opposing the system of drafting, declaring it a failure, and repealing all Acts authorizing drafts. The House rejected the measure—42 voting in its favor, and 84 against. All those voting in its favor were Democrats. Only three Democrats voted against it.

Feb. 1, 1864. A resolution favoring a more vigorous policy in the enlistment of negroes, to relieve thereby the burdens resting upon the white soldiers, was passed, by a vote of—yeas 80, nays 46. All Democrats in the negative.

Feb. 12, 1864. An amendment to the Supplementary Enrollment bill, providing for the enrollment of colored persons, passed the House. The vote stood 84 yeas to 71 nays. Not a Democrat voted in its favor.

It is a noticeable fact, that at the very time when negroes were being employed by the rebel army, and their enrollment sanctioned by Confederate legislation, the Democrats of the North were united in opposition to such a policy on the part of the Federal Government.

The bill, as amended, passed by a vote of 94 yeas to 65 nays, only five Democrats voting in its favor on the final passage.

Feb. 15, 1864. Mr. Arnold offered a resolution, "That the Constitution be so amended as to abolish slavery in the United States, wherever it now exists, and to prohibit its existence in every part thereof forever." This resolution was passed by a vote of 78 to 62, only one Democrat favoring it.

March 17, 1864. On a bill before the House to incorporate the Metropolitan Railroad Company of the District of Columbia, the proviso, "That there shall be no regulation excluding any person from any car on account of color," was agreed to—yeas 76, nays 62, not a Democrat voting for it.

March 21, 1864. Pending the Army Appropriation bill, the proviso was offered, "That no part of the money herein appropriated shall be applied or used for the purpose of raising, arming, equipping, or paying negro soldiers."

This was favored by 18 Democrats, opposed by 8 Democrats and 74 Republicans.

April 6, 1864. A vote was taken in the House on a section of the Currency bill, authorizing the issue to National Banks of small notes. The vote stood—yeas 76, nays 54, only four Democrats voting in its favor.

April 9, 1864. A resolution was introduced in the House by Mr. Colfax, declaring Alexander Long unworthy to be a member, said Long having favored upon the floor the recognition of the independence of the Southern Confederacy. The vote on this stood—yeas 80, nays 70, only one Democrat voting in its favor. On the same day, Mr. Washburn offered a resolution for the expulsion of Benjamin G. Harris for the following language: "The South asked you to let them go in peace. But no, you said you would bring them into subjection. That is not done yet; and God Almighty grant that it never may be. I hope that you will never subjugate

the South." The vote stood, yeas 84, nays 68, only one Democrat voting in its favor. The resolution requiring a two-thirds vote, it was lost. Mr. Schenck then offered a resolution of censure, the vote on this standing yeas 98, nays 20, seventeen Democrats voting in favor of it, and twenty-one refusing to vote.

April 16, 1864. A bill passed the House preventing States from taxing the capital stock of National Banks at a higher rate than an equal amount of capital in the hands of individual citizens, also preventing the taxation by States of the capital invested in U. S. Bonds for deposit on circulation. The vote stood 70 yeas to 60 nays, only two Democrats voting in its favor.

April 30, 1864. A bill increasing soldiers' pay, and giving bounty to colored soldiers, passed the House by a vote of 80 yeas to 61 nays, only two Democrats voting in its favor. All Democrats against it.

June 6, 1864. A bill for the punishment of guerrillas, passed the House, yeas 72, nays 37, only two Democrats voting in its favor.

June 13, 1864. The House passed the bill for the repeal of the Fugitive Slave law. The vote stood, yeas 90, nays 62, only one Democrat voting in favor of this most righteous measure.

June 28, 1864. Pending the consideration of the loan bill, Mr. Holman moved to add this proviso: "That nothing in this act shall impair the right of the States to tax the bonds, notes, and other obligations issued under this Act." It was rejected by a vote of 71 to 77, not a Democrat voting against it.

June 29, 1864. The following proviso to the civil appropriation bill pending in the House: "That in the Courts of the United States there shall be no exclusion of any witness on account of color" was adopted, yeas 68, nays 48, not a Democrat voting in its favor.

July 2, 1864. One of the most important military bills of the war passed the House. It provided for the raising of additional troops either by volunteer enlistment or by drafting. The President, under this Act, called for 500,000 men for one year, July 18, 1864. Vital as were the provisions of this bill for the success of our cause, the vote stood, yeas 66, nays 55, not a Democrat voting in its favor.

July 4, 1864. The special war income tax of 5 per cent. on all incomes over \$600 a year was adopted by the House, by a vote of 53 yeas to 49 nays, not a Democrat voting in its favor. It passed the Senate on the same day by a vote of 28 to 7, only one Democrat voting for it.

Jan. 9, 1865. A joint resolution passed the House declaring that the wife and children of any person mustered into the United States service shall be forever free, any law, usage, or custom whatsoever to the contrary notwithstanding. The vote stood, 74 yeas to 63 nays, not a Democrat voting in its favor.

January 16, 1865. Mr. Cox offered a reso-

lution, that the President be requested to send commissioners to the Confederate authorities "with a view to national pacification and tranquility" "although we do not know that the insurgents are yet prepared to agree to any terms of pacification which we would or should deem acceptable." The vote on this stood, yeas 51, nays 84, only two Democrats voting against it.

A similar resolution was introduced by Mr. Dawson, Feb. 13, 1865, and laid upon the table by a vote of 73 to 47, only one Democrat voting with the 72 Republicans in favor of tabling the resolution.

Jan. 31, 1865. The joint resolution, proposing an amendment to the Constitution for the extinction of slavery throughout the United States, and requiring a two-thirds vote for its passage, passed the House, by the following vote, yeas 119, nays 56, only sixteen Democrats voting in its favor.

February 27, 1865, an amendment was offered to a pending military bill, repealing all acts or part of acts authorizing conscription. This was favored by 27 Democrats, and opposed by only 10; 84 Republicans voting against it.

The Enrollment Act of March 3, 1865, containing important provisions for strengthening the army, passed the House by a vote of 72 to 56, only five Democrats voting in its favor.

March 3, 1865, a bill for the establishment of the Freedman's bureau, to have the general superintendence of all freedmen; to watch over the execution of all laws, proclamations and military orders of emancipation, and to establish necessary regulations for their protection, was passed by the House by a vote of 77 yeas, to 52 nays, only one Democrat voting for it.

March 3, 1865, Mr. Schenck from the Military Committee reported a resolution for the revocation of the military order which required all colored persons leaving Washington to procure passes. The vote stood, yeas 75, nays 24, only 4 Democrats voting for it.

Thus the record might be continued with the votes on other measures of equal importance.

The public acts to which reference has been made, and the votes thereon, are but a few of the many that could be shown proving the deep-rooted Democratic sympathy for the Confederate cause, and the organized opposition of the party to measures absolutely essential to the successful prosecution of the war. Can any impartial mind in the review of the votes presented, be brought to believe that a Democratic majority in Congress would have ever secured the preservation of the Union. To the strong Republican majorities, representing the national will, and the determination of the loyal people to maintain, without compromise or dishonor, the unity and integrity of the Republic, we owe the existence of the Government. This much, at least, the impartial historian will accord to the Republican party, and its patriotic record when the political history of the Rebellion is truthfully written.

From the record presented, three conclusions may be fairly drawn:

1. The encouragement which the Democratic party gave to the secession conspirators, before the war, lost none of its force during its prosecution.

2. The attitude of the Democratic party, if not openly hostile to the Union cause, was far from friendly to it.

3. If the policy of the Democratic party, as foreshadowed by its votes in Congress, had prevailed, the Southern Confederacy would be to-day an established fact.

Would the restoration of such a party to power be conducive to the interest of the nation? Would not the future peace and prosperity of the Republic be endangered by Democratic ascendancy? Would not the organized opposition to the enactment of those measures which are now the laws of the land, find expression in a failure to execute or administer them? In a word, would not the restoration of the Democratic party to the control of the Nation, be the restoration of that political power which encouraged the South to secede, and discouraged by vote and example the efforts of a loyal people to suppress the rebellion and preserve the Union? These are questions for the people to answer at the ballot-box. They will then and there resolve themselves into a single question: "Shall those who were the enemies of the nation in time of war, be chosen by the people as their trusted guardians in time of peace?"

DEMOCRATIC POLICY WOULD HAVE LED TO CONFEDERATE RECOGNITION.

It has been shown by the record submitted, that Democracy encouraged the rebellion, and opposed those efforts which were deemed necessary for its suppression.

It may be urged by its leaders to-day, that it was in favor of suppressing the rebellion, and that its opposition was not to the Union, but to the means employed to save it. Whatever its purpose may have been, it is certain that the effect of its opposition to the means employed tended to prolong the war, by holding out the hope to those in rebellion that peace would be obtained through the recognition of the Southern Confederacy.

When the Southern States seceded, they did so with the determination never to return to the Union. If the history of the movement is clearer on one point than another, it is on this resolution of the seceded States never to submit to Federal authority. An independent Southern Confederacy was the only ultimatum which the South had to offer as a basis of peace. The official and private correspondence received from the South; the speeches of its leaders, and the language of its press; the debates in State legislatures and in the Confederate Congress; the informal conferences held from time to time; the proclamations and messages of its President, all go to prove, that, from the inception to the close of the movement, peace was not desirable, except

on the basis of a recognition of the Southern Confederacy. Yet, with a full knowledge of this fact, Democracy, throughout the war, kept clamoring for a peace which its leaders knew could not be had, and for a peaceful settlement of existing difficulties, which they knew to be impossible.

In April, 1861, Roger A. Pryor, of Virginia, said, in response to a serenade, at Charleston, South Carolina:

"Gentlemen, I thank you, especially that you have at last annihilated this accursed Union, reeking with corruption and insolent with excess of tyranny. Thank God! it is at last blasted and riven by the lightning wrath of an outraged and indignant people. Not only is it gone, but gone forever. In the expressive language of Scripture, it is water spilt upon the ground which cannot be gathered up. Like Lucifer, son of the morning, it has fallen, never to rise again. For my part, gentlemen, if Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal Hamlin to-morrow were to abdicate their offices and were to give me a blank sheet of paper to write the condition of re-annexation to the defunct Union, I would scornfully spurn the overture."

These sentiments were received with tumultuous applause and wild enthusiasm, and, as subsequent events showed, truthfully represented the prevailing opinion at the South. Yet in the face of these positive expressions, while the life of the nation trembled in the balance, Democracy devoted its energies to the discussion of the Constitutional rights of those who were leading armies against the Government, and in demanding for rebels in arms the same mild treatment accorded to law-abiding citizens. Is it any wonder that the loyal people distrusted Democracy, and that the Confederates regarded it as a Northern ally, whose triumph meant Southern independence.

Reference to letters written by Southern leaders, and to the debates in the rebel Congress, and the editorials in the Southern press, strengthen the statement that the forlorn hope of the Southern Confederacy centered in the restoration to power of the Democratic party.

In the winter of 1862, (Dec. 24,) George N. Sanders wrote a letter to certain prominent New York Democrats. The letter was headed:

"Governor Seymour, Dean Richmond, John Van Buren, Charles O'Connor, Washington Hunt, Fernando Wood, and James Brooks, representative men of the *triumphant revolutionary party of New York.*"

In his letter he said:

"Let heart and brain into the revolution; accelerate and direct the movement, get rid of the Baboon, (or What is it!) Abraham Lincoln, peacefully, if you can, but by the blood of his followers, if necessary. Withdraw your support, material and moral, from the invading armies, and the South will make quick work with the Abolitionists that remain on her soil. Suffer no degenerate son of the South, upon

however plausible pretext, to idly embarrass your action by throwing into your way rotten planks of reconstruction. *Unity is no longer possible.* The very word Union, once so dear, has been made the cover for so many atrocious acts, that the mere mention of it is odious in the ears of Southern people. The State legislatures will be called upon to obliterate the hated name from the counties and towns."

This was the response of the South to the Democratic triumphs throughout the North in November, 1862. How faithfully these "representative men of the triumphant revolutionary party of New York," endeavored to carry out the plan suggested by Mr. Sanders, may be understood by consulting their record, and noting their persistent opposition to the efforts of the Government to suppress the rebellion.

After the Democratic successes in the fall of 1862, Southern papers took occasion to assure the North that there could be no peace except by recognizing the Confederacy.

The Richmond *Examiner* said:

"They do not yet understand that we are resolute to be rid of them forever, and determined rather to die than to live with them in the same political community again."

The Richmond *Dispatch*, anticipating a Democratic majority in Congress, as a result of the elections, said:

"It is probable, that they might propose a reconstruction of the Union, with certain pledges, guarantees, &c. To this the South will never consent. They will never exist in the same political association, be its name what it may, be its terms what they will, and be the guarantees whatever the good will of the Democrats may make them. We of the Confederate States have made up our minds to endure the worst extremity to which war can reduce a people. We are prepared for it. The Government that should propose to reunite us with the Yankees could not exist a day. It would sink so deep beneath the deluge of popular indignation, that even history would not be able to fish up the wreck."

Again, on the 18th of October, the same paper said:

"Nor, after the sacrifices which the South has suffered at Northern hands, could she ever consent, of her own free will, to live under the same government with that people."

In December (2) 1862, the Legislature of North Carolina, as if fearful that Northern Democracy would insist upon the Southern States coming back on their own terms, passed this resolution:

"Resolved: That the separation between the Confederate States and the United States is final, and that the people of North Carolina will never consent to a re-union at any time or upon any terms."

December 8, 1862. Governor Letcher, of Virginia, wrote:

"Let it be understood that the separation is and ought to be final and irrevocable; that Virginia will under no circumstances entertain any proposition from any quarter which

may have for its object a restoration or reconstruction of the late Union, on any terms or conditions whatever."

In a speech delivered at Richmond, and reported in the *Enquirer* of January 7, 1863, President Davis said:

"By showing themselves so utterly disgraced, that if the question was proposed to you whether you would combine with hyenas or Yankees, I trust every Virginian would say, give me the hyenas."

The *Dispatch* of January 11, 1863, said:

"We warn the Democrats and Conservatives of the North to dismiss from their minds at once the miserable delusion that the South can ever consent to enter again, upon any terms, the old Union. If the North will allow us to write the Constitution ourselves, and give us every guarantee we would ask, we would sooner be under the Government of England or France than under a Union with men who have shown that they cannot keep good faith, and are the most barbarous and inhuman, as well as treacherous of mankind."

The Richmond *Sentinel* thus replies to the address of New Hampshire Democrats, declaring that if the South would "come back into the Union, the Democracy of the North will do all in their power to gain for them (the Southern States) such guarantees as will secure their safety:"

"Do the New Hampshire Democrats suppose for one moment that we could so much as think of re-union with such a people? Rather tell one to be wedded to a corpse! Rather join hands with a fiend from the pit. When those in the United States who are disposed to deal fairly with us shall gain the rule, we may in time begin to bury the many bitter memories which now add energy to our resentment, and make with them treaties that shall be mutually advantageous. Perhaps, hereafter, good will may be revived again. But Union—never let it be mentioned! It is impossible."

The Richmond *Enquirer* of October 13, 1863, said:

"What we mean to win is utter separation from them for all time. We do not want to govern their country; but after levying upon it what seemeth good to us, by way of indemnity, we leave it to commence its political life again from the beginning, hoping that the lesson may have made them sadder and wiser Yankees. We shut them out forever, with all their unclean and scoundrelly ways, intending to lead our lives here in our own confederate way, within our own well-guarded bounds, and without, as St. John says, 'without are dogs.'"

September 28, 1863, a resolution was introduced into the Virginia House of Delegates for inquiring into the tone and temper of the people of the United States on the subject of peace, with a view to responding, if favorable. The *Sentinel*, of the 29th, in speaking of it, said:

"The House, by a unanimous vote, put its foot on the resolution, without a word of discussion, or a moment of delay. In this it

but fairly represented the manliness and unanimity of our people."

In 1864, Henry W. Allen, Governor of Louisiana, said in his inaugural:

"I speak to-day by authority. I speak as the Governor of Louisiana, and I wish it to be known at Washington, and elsewhere, that rather than reconstruct this Government and go back to the Union, on any terms whatever, the people of Louisiana will, in convention assembled, without a dissenting voice, cede the State to any European power."

The *Richmond Dispatch*, in March, 1864, in an editorial on President Lincoln's amnesty proclamation, said:

"No one, however, knows better than Abraham Lincoln, that any terms he might offer the Southern people which contemplate their restoration to his bloody and brutal Government, would be rejected with scorn and execration. If, instead of devoting to death our President and military and civil officers, he had proposed to make Jeff. Davis his successor, Lee, Commander-in-chief of the Yankee armies, and our domestic institutions not only recognized at home, but re-adopted in the free States, provided the South would once more enter the Yankee Union, there is not a man, woman, or child in the Confederacy, who would not spit upon the proposition. We desire no companionship upon any terms with a nation of robbers and murderers."

A volume might be easily filled with sentiments similar to those quoted, showing that the people of the South were determined to accept no terms whatever that ignored the recognition of the Southern Confederacy.

Yet, with a full knowledge of this determination on the part of the South, and the impossibility of restoring the Union, except by the defeat of the Confederate armies, the Democratic party tried to divide Northern sentiment and cripple the administration, by proclaiming that the Southern States were anxious to return to the Union, and that the Republican party would not allow them.

Impartial history will record these facts:

1. The Southern States gave up the Confederacy when they could no longer sustain it.
2. They came back to the Union when they had no power to keep themselves out.
3. The people are indebted for the preservation of the Union, not to the Southern States, for accepting what they had no power to reject, nor to the Democratic party for its peace propositions, but to the Republican party for organizing the means necessary for the prosecution of the war, and to the loyal millions who supported it with their votes, and under its inspiration fought for the salvation of the Union.

Can the nation forget these facts in ten short years? Can it blindly turn aside from Republicanism to the embrace of Democracy? Can it safely transfer the control of its Government from hands known to be loyal to those still red with the blood of its defenders? These are questions for the American

people to answer, and on their solution depends the weal or woe of the Republic.

CONFEDERATE HOPES OF A DEMOCRATIC TRIUMPH.

It has been shown that, despite the assertion of the Northern Democracy, the Southern States were at no time, from the inception of the rebellion to its final crushing defeat, willing to make peace on any other terms than the recognition of the Southern Confederacy. To assume that Democratic leaders were ignorant of this, is to assume that those who were in correspondence with leading rebels knew less of their intentions than those who were not.

The Presidential election of 1864 was the turning-point in the rebellion. The Chicago Democratic Convention had declared the war a failure, and favored a cessation of hostilities. McClellan was the Presidential candidate on this platform. Although he professed a desire to restore the Union, it was plainly evident that his election would secure its permanent disruption. Rebel sympathizers in the North believed this, and the rebel authorities in the South so regarded it. The Southern Confederacy strained every nerve to hold out until the people of the North decided for the Union or against it. The re-election of Abraham Lincoln was the death blow of the slave confederacy. Its shell was broken, and its formidable resistance at an end. The defeat of the Democratic party was the extinction of its hopes and pretensions.

In an interview with Governor Randall, in 1864, President Lincoln said:

"I do not think it is personal vanity or ambition, though I am not free from these infirmities, but I cannot but feel that the weal or woe of this great nation will be decided in November. There is no programme offered by any wing of the Democratic party but that must result in the permanent destruction of the Union."

"But, Mr. President," ventured Governor Randall, "General McClellan is in favor of crushing out this rebellion by force. He will be the Chicago candidate."

"Sir," replied Mr. Lincoln, "the slightest knowledge of arithmetic will prove to any man that the rebel armies cannot be destroyed by Democratic strategy. It would sacrifice all the white men of the North to do it. There are now in the service of the United States nearly 200,000 able-bodied colored men, most of them under arms, defending and acquiring Union territory. The Democratic strategy demands that these forces be disbanded, and that the masters be conciliated by restoring them to slavery. The black men who now assist Union men to escape, are to be converted into our enemies, in the vain hope of gaining the good will of their masters. We shall have to fight two nations instead of one."

"You cannot conciliate the South, if you guarantee to them ultimate success; and the experience of the present war proves their success is inevitable if you fling the compul-

very labor of millions of black men into their side of the scale. Will you give our enemies such military advantage as to insure success, and then depend on coaxing, flattery, and concession to get them back into the Union? Abandon all the posts now garrisoned by black men, take 200,000 men from our side and put them in the battle-field or corn-field against us, and we would be compelled to abandon the war in three weeks.

"We have to hold territory in inclement and sickly places; where are the Democrats to do this? It was a free fight, and the field was open to the war Democrats to put down this rebellion by fighting against both master and slave, long before the present policy was inaugurated.

"There have been men base enough to propose to me to return to slavery the black warriors of Port Hudson and Olustee, and thus win the respect of the masters they fought. Should I do so, I should deserve to be damned in time and eternity. Come what will, I will keep my faith with friend and foe. My enemies pretend I am now carrying on this war for the sole purpose of abolition. So long as I am President it shall be carried on for the sole purpose of restoring the Union. But no human power can subdue this rebellion without the use of the emancipation policy, and every other policy calculated to weaken the moral and physical forces of the rebellion."

These practical views of President Lincoln fully illustrate what was then thought of the conservative policy of the Democratic party throughout the war. It was a policy which insisted upon treating as friends, men who had repudiated friendship, and who proclaimed themselves uncompromising enemies.

In a letter to Hon. E. B. Washburne, dated August 16, 1864, General Grant thus refers to Confederate hopes of a Democratic triumph in the North:

"I have no doubt but that the enemy are exceedingly anxious to hold out until after the Presidential election. They have many hopes from its effects. They hope for a counter revolution; they hope for the election of a peace candidate; in fact, like Micawber, they hope for something to turn up. Our peace friends, if they expect peace from separation, are much mistaken. It would be but the beginning of war, with thousands of Northern men joining the South, because of our disgrace in allowing separation. To have 'peace on any terms,' the South would demand a restoration of their slaves already freed. They would demand indemnity for losses sustained, and they would demand a treaty that would make the North slave hunters for the South. They would demand pay or the restoration of every slave escaping to the North."

Similar views were expressed by General Thomas, and other leading Union generals, who recognized in a Democratic triumph the success of the Confederacy.

It can be readily shown that while the Democratic party was trying to deceive the

Northern people into the belief that the election of McClellan in 1864 would bring about a restoration of the Union, Southern leaders were regarding his election as the certain step toward Confederate recognition.

Sep. 22, 1864. Alexander H. Stephens, wrote to some of the leading members of the Georgia Legislature, and thus expressed himself in regard to the Democratic party:

"The action of the Chicago convention, so far as its platform of principles goes, presents, as I have said on another occasion, a ray of light, which, under Providence, may prove the dawn of day to this long and cheerless night, the first ray of light I have seen from the North since the war began. This cheers the heart and towards it I could almost exclaim: 'Hail! holy light, offspring of Heaven, first-born of the eternal, co-eternal beam. May I express thee unblamed, since God is light.' Indeed I could have quite so exclaimed, but for the sad reflection that whether it shall bring healing in its beams or be lost in a dark and ominous eclipse ere its good work be done, depends so much upon the actions of others who may not regard it and view it as I do. So at best it is but a ray, a small and tremulous ray, enough only to gladden the heart and quicken the hope."

William W. Boyce, in a letter to Jefferson Davis, dated September 29, 1864, thus refers to the efforts of Northern Democracy.

"But fortunately, Mr. Lincoln and those he represents, are not all of the North. There is a powerful party which condemns his policy. That party is rational on the subject of slavery. It represents whatever of amity or conservatism is left at the North. This party proposes that the war shall cease, at least temporarily, and that all the States should meet in amicable council, to make peace if possible. This is the most imposing demonstration in favor of peace made at the North since the war broke out. I think our only hope of a satisfactory peace, one consistent with the preservation of free institutions, is the supremacy of this party at some time or other. Our policy, therefore, is to give this party all the capital we can. It may be objected, that to meet the Northern States in convention, is to abandon our present form of government. But this no more follows than that their meeting us implies an abandonment of their form of government. A congress of the States in their sovereign capacity, is the highest acknowledgment of the principles of State rights."

Herschel V. Johnson, in a letter dated September 25, 1864, in referring to the peace movements of Democracy, said:

"I look with anxiety to the approaching Presidential election in the United States. For, although the Chicago platform falls below the great occasion, and the nominee still lower, yet the triumph of the Democratic party of the North will certainly secure a temporary suspension of hostilities and an effort to make peace by an appeal to reason. They confess that four years of bloody war, as a means of restoring the Union, has proven

a failure. They declare that the true principles of American Government have been disregarded and trampled under foot by the present executive of the United States. Their success will bring a change of administration, and, with that, a change of policy.

* * * * *

"If the Government of the United States should pass into other hands, repudiate the policy of subjugation, and indicate a desire for negotiation, I would, if need be, have our Government propose it—certainly accept the offer of it, if tendered by the Federal authorities.

"We cannot have peace so long as the present rulers of the United States are in power."

In a letter to Thomas J. Semmes, under date of Nov. 5, 1864, Alexander H. Stephens, in speaking of the Chicago Convention, and its desire for a convention of States, said:

"There is no prospect of such a proposition being tendered, unless McClellan should be elected. He cannot be elected without carrying a sufficient number of the States, which, if united with those of the Confederacy, would make a majority of the States. In such a convention, then, so formed, have we not strong reasons to hope and expect that a resolution could be passed, denying the constitutional power of the Government, under the compact of 1787, to coerce a State? The Chicago platform virtually does this already. Are there not strong reasons, at least, to induce us to hope and believe that they might? If that could be done, it would end the war. It would recognize as the fundamental principle of American institutions the ultimate, absolute sovereignty of the several States. This fully covers our independence—as fully as I wish ever to see it covered.

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"You will also allow me to say, that I look upon the election of McClellan as a matter of vast importance to us in every view of the case, and hence I thought it judicious, patriotic, and wise, to do every thing that could be properly done to aid in his election. Whatever may be his individual opinion, he is the candidate of the State Rights party of the North, in opposition to the centralists and consolidationists, whose hobby now is abolitionism. I have thought from the beginning, that our true policy was to build up and strengthen such a party at the North by all means in our power. Not only upon the wise maxim of Philip of Macedon, to divide the enemy as a question of policy merely, but from a higher and much nobler motive. Not only an early peace, but our future safety, security, and happiness required it.

"The old Union and the old Constitution are both dead, dead forever, except in so far as the Constitution has been preserved by us. There is for the Union as it was, no resurrection by any power short of that which brought Lazarus from the tomb. There may be, and doubtless are, many at the North, and some at the South, who look forward to

tion as it was; but such ideas are vain and illusory, as the dreamy imaginings of the Indian warrior, who, in death, clings to his weapons in fond expectation that he will have use for them beyond the grave, in other lands and new hunting grounds.

"These fears of *voluntary* reconstruction are but chimeras of the brain. No one need entertain any such from McClellan's election. But, on the contrary, I think that peace, upon the basis of a separation of the States and our independence, would be the almost certain ultimate result, if our authorities should act wisely, in the event of his election. * * * *

"At least two-thirds of McClellan's own party manfully hold and proclaim the doctrine that there is no power in the central Government to coerce a State. This element would oppose a further prosecution of the war. Meanwhile, financial embarrassments would be doing their work. The war would inevitably fail in consequence (in the event of McClellan's attempting to carry it on). When all efforts to persuade our people to go back into the Union voluntarily failed, as they would, if our authorities shall so act as to secure the hearts and affections of the people as they ought, then McClellan would ultimately be compelled to give up the restoration of the Union as a forlorn hope. Peace would come slowly but surely upon our own terms, and without any more fighting.

"Other causes would operate to the same results, which, of themselves, even without considering those above stated, would effect the same thing. The moment McClellan should renew the war with the avowed object of restoring the Union with the old Constitution and all its guarantees, that moment, or as soon as possible, our recognition abroad would come.

"Lincoln had either to witness our recognition abroad, the moral power of which alone, he saw, would break down the war, or to make it an emancipation war. He chose the latter alternative, and the more readily because it chimed in so accordantly with the feelings and views of his own party. This, in my opinion, is the plain English of the whole matter; and just as soon as McClellan should renew the war with a view to restore the Union, the old Constitution, with slavery, etc., would England, France, and other European Powers, throw all the moral power and influence of their recognition on our side.

"So in any and every view I can take of the subject, I regard the election of McClellan, and the success of the State Rights party of the North, whose nominee he is, of the utmost importance to us. With these views, you readily perceive how I regarded the action of the Chicago convention as a ray of light, the first ray of *real* light I had seen from the North since this war began."

The views presented, coming as they do from those who were considered conservative leaders in the South, prove conclusively, that the Democratic policy, throughout the

siting well-grounded hopes of the ultimate recognition of the Southern Confederacy. They further prove that the old Democratic cry of the "Constitution as it is, and the Union as it was," was as utterly repudiated by the rebels themselves as was the Federal authority against which they fought. Therefore, it may be fairly concluded, that the triumph of the Democratic party in 1864 would have resulted in the permanent dissolution of the American Union.

DEMOCRACY AND RECONSTRUCTION.

Has Democracy changed in its principles since the close of the war? If it has, there is no record of the change. Throughout the period of reconstruction, when the Government sought to throw proper safeguards around the Republic, and to provide a Republican form of government in those States lately in rebellion, the Democratic party was even more unanimous in its opposition to Governmental measures than it was during the war, and this opposition it has continued down to the present time.

The 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution, absolutely necessary for the protection of the nation in the future, were opposed unanimously by the Democrats, not only in Congress, but throughout the States passing upon their ratification. The joint resolution proposing the 14th Amendment, passed the House, June 8, 1866, by a vote of 138 yeas to 36 nays, not a Democrat voting in its favor. The joint resolution proposing the 15th Amendment, passed the House, January 30, 1869, by a vote of 150 yeas to 42 nays, not a Democrat voting in its favor.

Thus two of the most important amendments to the Constitution, on which vast interests of property and life depend for safety and security, are in force to-day, without the endorsement of a single Democratic vote. Is it probable, in view of this significant fact, that a Democratic administration would faithfully carry out their righteous provisions?

A review of the Congressional record shows a marked unanimity on the part of the Democrats against all measures of reconstruction. During the war, they based their opposition on the ground that the Union could be preserved without fighting, although the mighty armies of the Confederacy proved this to be impossible. At the close of the war, they opposed all reconstruction measures on the ground that the States could be restored without them, although disorder, and anarchy, and smothered hate in the rebellious States proved this to be impossible.

The Government exerted itself to restore all the Southern States to their proper relations in the Union, and to lift as quickly as possible the hardships of war from the shoulders of the Southern people. But at all times, in every effort, Democracy met it with opposition. It threw obstacles in the way; it encouraged the Southern people to believe, as it did in 1860, that their rights were being invaded: it aroused a feeling of bitterness

was forced to contend; it created divisions among those who had honestly accepted the situation; it finally arrayed, through its influence, the whites against the blacks. In a word, it prolonged the period of reconstruction, as it had the period of war, by clamoring for certain conditions which it knew to be impossible, and by holding out hopes to the Southern States which it knew could never be realized.

The Ku-Klux organizations, the white leagues, the bloody massacres of helpless blacks, the disorders which have called for Federal interference, can be traced, as directly as was the rebellion, to the encouragement given to them, in Congress and out, by the votes and speeches of Democratic leaders.

Whatever of peace and prosperity have been secured to the Southern States, and especially to the Nation, since the close of the war, is due to the wisdom and firmness of the Republican party. As it prosecuted the war for the preservation of the Union, and turned neither to the right nor to the left until this was accomplished, so it has gone straight forward in the work of reconstruction; and, unmindful of the Democratic obstacles which it has encountered, it has restored peace and prosperity to the revolted States, and advanced the material wealth of the country more than four times the entire cost of the war.

If any one honestly believes that the Democratic party has become converted by the logic of events, he has but to study the work of the party in those States where it has obtained control. The character of the laws enacted in regard to suffrage and labor; the reassertion of the old State Rights doctrine, which marked its rule in *ante bellum* times; the cunningly-drawn amendments to State Constitutions, intended to again divide allegiance; the political character of the men who are to represent it in the coming Congress; the elevation, through its votes and influence, of those who were mainly responsible for the Southern rebellion, and who led its armies against the Government—all these things combined, point, as with the finger of prophecy, to the resurrection of the fatal doctrine of State Rights under Democratic domination, if again clothed with national power by the votes of the American people. Its votes, its speeches, its acts, prove the Democratic party the same enemy of good government that was dismissed from power in 1860. Shall it be restored? Can the Nation trust in its hands its honor, its unity, and the solution of those great problems of humanity and civilization, which to-day demand the highest wisdom and the purest patriotism?

Why should it trust to-day what it dared not trust in 1860, 1864, 1868, 1872? The party has not changed. Its principles, its sympathy, its purposes, are as clearly defined now as then. If the Nation could not trust the men who voted and worked against the Union, how can it trust them, now that they are under the domination of those who fought

party that has so nobly borne the burdens of the past, and so grandly brought the Nation through its trials. Let them forget all local jealousies and minor issues until it is settled beyond dispute, that the men who saved the

Republic shall continue to govern it. Let them hold out to all, whether friends or foes, that the only true basis for reconciliation and safety is devotion to the Union, and obedience to its laws and authority.

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